The IoT data API for edge & connected devices.
One keyless API your devices plug into both ways: verified world-data in — signed and checkable on-device — and signed telemetry out, with a hash of a reading anchored to Bitcoin. The same substrate our robotics / ROS 2 package rides on.
The call
Keyless over MCP, or one REST call with a free key. Every datapoint is provenance-stamped and citeable.
# REST (free key)
curl -H "X-API-Key: $KEY" "https://dynamicfeed.ai/weather?city=Sydney"
# MCP (keyless) — point any client at https://dynamicfeed.ai/mcp, then call:
current_weather, energy_grid, grid_carbon, air_quality, gps_interference, space_weather, flood_forecast, …Sample response
{ "temperature_c": 17.1, "humidity_pct": 87, "conditions": "Mainly clear",
"provenance": { "source": "Open-Meteo", "measured_at": "2026-06-14T04:00:00Z" },
"signature": { "alg": "Ed25519", "key_id": "df-ed25519-4cb32e72f333" } }Why live data
IoT devices act on data and produce it. Dynamic Feed is the verifiable layer for both: world-data feeds an edge device consumes over keyless MCP or REST and verifies on-device via the Ed25519 signature before acting, and a notary that anchors a hash of the device's own reading to Bitcoin for a tamper-evident proof. It is the same substrate our robotics / ROS 2 package and on-device verifier ride on. It is not device management, not a safety system, and not a certification — it is verifiable data: evidence, not a safety guarantee, and the device's own stack owns every decision.
Use it for
- Edge gateways — pull signed weather, grid, air-quality and GPS-integrity feeds
- Energy / DER / VPP devices — verify a grid or carbon signal before a dispatch
- Fleet telematics — anchor a reading hash for an independent record per asset
- Drone & robotics edge — the same verifiable layer as our ROS 2 package
FAQ
Is it keyless?
Yes. Point any MCP client at https://dynamicfeed.ai/mcp (or run npx dynamicfeed-mcp), or POST /v1/batch over plain REST — no key to start.
How does a device trust a reading?
Every datapoint is Ed25519-signed over its exact bytes and provenance-stamped. The device verifies the signature on-device against /.well-known/keys before acting — stale, swapped or tampered data fails the check.
Can a device prove its own readings?
Yes. Hash a reading locally and POST /v1/anchor the digest for a Bitcoin-anchored proof it existed unchanged at a time. Hashes only — the data never leaves the device.